; 's is atemporal just in case s is not inside time') and to replace them with Revised Truth Conditions (e.g. 's is temporal just in case s has a concrete nature that is inside time'; 's is atemporal just in case s has a concrete nature such that it is not the case that that nature is inside time' p.191). In the rest of the book, Pawl uses this strategy to address a variety of apparently inconsistent predicates. To begin, I do not think that Pawl's strategy can be successfully employed with regards to essential atemporality and strong immutability, which Pawl affirms against the view of many contemporary theologians.
Pawl assumes that creating a human nature and a particular hypostatic union does not require change (pp. 205-206) . However, as he notes, the assumption that creating does not require a real change in the Creator is controversial. It is a weakness of the book that Pawl does not cite any literature that argues for this important assumption nor does he offer any argument for it, merely stating that it would take him too far afield from Christology to do so (pp. 205-206) .
Pawl also utilizes the idea of 'Mixed Relations', which requires a change only on the part of one of the relata, and he insists that 'the incarnation requires no change in the divine nature, but rather the human nature and the hypostatic union both begin to exist, and, given 'myself being consciously aware' occurs in SC1 and 'myself being consciously unaware' occurs in SC2, and that these two self-consciousnesses are contradictory and therefore cannot exist in the same self simultaneously.
In response, Pawl (p.224) draws a distinction between a thing which is self-conscious (the person…), and the faculty in virtue of which the person is self-conscious. He suggests that, in the Incarnation case, counting self-consciousness by faculties in virtue of which something is self-conscious, the number is two, while counting self-consciousness by supposita that are conscious, the number is one. Pawl challenges the claim that SC1 and SC2 are contradictory by suggesting the following Revised Truth Conditionals: Nestorianism is true.' (p.226). He objects that the 'consciousness' is not referring to the supposit, but to the nature, or faculty by which the supposit is conscious, and since neither nature is identical to a person, the consequent is false' (p.226). Pawl goes on to say that 'These two faculties could be pointed at one another as the 'thou' of their thoughts (or, better, 6 the thoughts the supposit has due to the activities they perform),' but he denies that this entails two persons (p.226).
Such a response again fails to account for the first person perspective of Christ, or his "I-thoughts." How would Christ think of himself then, if he were to have two faculties which could be pointed at one another as the 'thou'? Pawl seems to have neglected the Scriptural evidences for thinking that an I-thou relationship implies two persons. For example, when Christ prayed 'not my will but yours be done' (Mark 14:36; italics mine) -which revealed his first person perspective-he was evidently aware that he was not talking to himself but to another person: the Father.
Pawl (p.227) notes that I defined personhood following the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy: 'the property of being a person has been thought to involve various traits, including (moral) agency, reason or rationality, language or the cognitive skills language may support (such as intentionality and self-consciousness), and the ability to enter into suitable relationship with other persons (Audi ed. 1999, 662) .' In reply, my definition is not merely based on a philosophy dictionary, but also on Scriptural passages such as Mark 14:36, according to which Christ exemplifies these traits. Pawl objects 'Since, on Conciliar Christology, the human nature of Christ, says "the Father is greater than I," and grows in wisdom, the human nature fulfils the definition of "person" that Loke is employing' (p.227).
In reply, it is not the human nature of Christ which does the saying; rather, it is the person of Christ who says, in respect of his functional subordinate role, that "the Father is greater than I." Growing in wisdom does not imply that the human nature has a self-consciousness of its own apart from that of Christ (indeed, on the one-consciousness DPM, that is not the case), and hence the human nature does not fulfil the definition of person.
In sum, the Two Consciousnesses Model is beset with the problem of Nestorianism.
The problem for Pawl is that this model seems to be the only model of Christ's consciousness 7 which is consistent with essential atemporality and strong immutability, and Pawl is committed to these because he thinks that they are taught by the Conciliar Fathers (pp.108-9).
However, it should be noted that the main reason why Conciliar Fathers employed terms taken from philosophy (e.g. hypostasis) rather than Scriptures in the first place was to use them as interpretative norms in their attempt to ensure that the Scriptures would be understood in the way that the Scriptural authors had intended them (Athanasius, Defence of the Nicene Definition 5.18-24, esp. 5.21). All the talk about Christ being atemporal and immutable qua divine was intended to convey the idea that Christ is truly divine within a context that was deeply influenced by Greek philosophy. 
